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Nokia Phones: From a Total Success to a Total Fiasco
A Study on Why Nokia Eventually Failed to Connect People, and an Analysis of
What the New Home of Nokia Phones Must Do to Succeed
Ahmed Alibage, Charles Weber
Dept. of Engineering and Technology Management, Portland State University, Portland, Oregon, USA
Abstract—This research intensively reviews and analyzes the
strategic management of technology at Nokia Corporation. Using
traditional narrative literature review and secondary sources, we
reviewed and analyzed the historical transformation of Nokia’s
core business, leadership strategies, business architecture, R&D
policy, innovation strategy, product lunch, and smartphones
recognition and demonstration. We identified various strategic
gaps that the previous analytical studies seemingly have missed to
identify and generalize. Therefore, we add to the literature a
bundle of the lessons learned that chronologically explain how
Nokia failed to create and sustain competitive advantages,
particularly in the smartphone market. We concluded that the
problem at Nokia was not the lack of innovation, but rather, it
was the lack of a precise technology forecasting, and
misunderstanding that the needs in smartphone market were not
just about demonstrating a mobile phone that makes calls, texts
and connects to the web, but also the platform that operates all
these functions together. Since Nokia’s brand name is recently
back in the market through a newly licensed firm (HMD Global),
we further discuss how likely the new Nokia’s smartphones will
possibly compete and plausibly succeed in a very well-established
market.

management made various strategic changes to take the
company back into its leading position, or at least into a
position that compensates or reduces the losses incurred since
then. These strategic changes included the replacement of the
CEO in 2010 to deploy new strategies. Nonetheless, Nokia’s
deterioration was consistent, year after year [3, 4, 6, 7].
According to [3], Nokia’s market capitalization dropped from
110 to 15 billion euros in 2012, which led the company to close
various factories and R&D facilities, in addition to laying off
many of its employees. Further, in September 2013, Microsoft
officially announced the purchase of Nokia’s business unit of
devices and services for 3.79 billion euros [3, 4] and patent
license for 1.65 billion euros [8]. However, Microsoft as well
couldn’t make any success in the space of smartphone market,
and later in May 2016, the feature phone assets were sold to
FIH Mobile Ltd., a subsidiary of Taiwanese firm Foxconn
Technology and a newly-established firm HMD Global for
$350 million [9, 10]. To this end, this research aims to answer
the following questions;
1.

What are the strategic gaps at Nokia Corporation that
led to its collapse, particularly in the smartphone
market, despite it was one of the world’s great corporate
success stories?

2.

How likely is the new home of Nokia phones, namely
(HMD Global) would succeed in the smartphone
market?

I. INTRODUCTION
Peter Drucker urges that the mission statement of any
business is what defines the starting point of its strategies and
plans [1]. The mission statement of Nokia was simple and
straightforward; “Connecting People” [2, p. 10]. Nokia was
focused on building its brand worldwide and achieving the
credibility and market leading, which it once had. In 1994, the
company successfully made the shift from a Finnish company
to a global payer and became during the 1990s and early 2000s
one of the world largest mobile phone firms in terms of
volume, sales, market share and profit [3]. The introduction of
its first smartphone N95 and the Symbian OS in Spring 2007
has fostered the company leading position proved by the jump
of its overall market share from 36% in 2006 to 38% in 2007
[4]. In fact, Nokia made another dominance, particularly in
smartphones industry with a market share of 70% in 2007 [3],
leaving its competitor far behind. However, Nokia’s story of
success started to fade away shortly after the introduction of the
Apple iPhone in the third quarter of 2007 [4] and the
breakthrough Human-Computer Interaction HCI, which set the
standards for the user experience [3]. Although the overall
market share reached 39% in 2008 [4] yet, all the financial
figures of Nokia started to decline. For instance, net sales
dropped by (-1%), operating profit by (-38%), and profit
attributable to equity holders by (-45%) [5]. As a result, senior

In this research, we intend to present that the story of a
significantly successful business may end up in a total fiasco,
particularly when the strategies and plans deviate from the
business mission and objectives. The business eventually fails
regardless of how high its market share or how superior its
leading position when the leadership fails to forecast the right
time of the technology to market, and underestimates and/or
misunderstand the total capabilities of the rivals, the market
size and demand, the customer wants and needs, and the
industry eco-system. Although the failure of a company such as
Nokia was too painful and extremely expensive yet, it can be
the perfect lessons learned to rethink the strategies for creating,
achieving and sustain competitive advantages.
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Our interest is to acquire a wider and deeper understanding
of why and how successful high-tech firms fail to create and
sustain competitive advantages. We choose Nokia as a
renowned story of success and a market leader for more than a
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decade, but eventually suffered a persistent declination until it
has completely failed to compete in the smartphone market.
Therefore, we follow a historical posture in solving issues and
interpreting ambiguities by collecting evidences that produce a
comprehension of the processes, mechanisms, and outcomes.
Our goal is to conduct a rigorous examination of the relevant
data (desk-research or secondary sources) using traditional
narrative literature review to summarizes the available body of
literature and draws conclusions regarding the issue in
question. This type of literature review is used to provide a
comprehensive background for understanding the current
knowledge of the problem and highlighting the implications of
new research. We started gathering data from multiple sources
by looking for information regarding the social, economic and
industrial history of Nokia between the late of the 1970s and
the present. The information was gathered focusing on Nokia’s
history, including published academic research, magazine and
journal articles, conferences preceding, as well as the firm’s
official history and annual reports. Moreover, we considered
the use of the available statistical data and logical reasoning to
cope with the potential subjectivity of the qualitative analysis
of the previous studies. The review comprises Nokia’s
successive leaderships and strategic changes, business
architecture, R&D policy, innovation strategy, products’ lunch,
and smartphones’ recognition. In the final analysis, we
employed multiple data sources to understand; (a) how Nokia
has transformed its business model and greatly succeeded
during the1990s and early 2000s, and (b) how its story of
success continued until it started to decline in 2008. Moreover,
our review and analysis extend to further our understanding of
how likely the new Nokia’s smartphones by the newly licensed
firm (HMD Global) possibly compete and plausibly succeed in
a very well-established market.
III. COMPANY OVERVIEW
Nokia is Finnish multinational communications and IT
corporation, which was founded in 1865 by Fredrik Idestam
under the name of Nokia Katabolic [3, 13]. The company went
through various changes over its history [6]. Its business model
has been transformed from different industries; rubber, paper,
and cable company to mobile handsets and mobile
telecommunication infrastructure [7, 13]. The most prominent
change happened between 1990 and 1996 when a fruitful
transformation of the business model has been made to save the
company from near bankruptcy and settled it on the path of
becoming one of the world’s great corporate success stories for
more than a decade and a half [6]. According to [14], the
success of Nokia during that time was achieved based on
various factors, namely; economic, cognitive, organizational,
and institutional. Furthermore, Nokia’s dominance viewed as it
was behavioral rather than structural [15]. In other words, it
was based on factors such as culture and diversity, which
articulated in corporate accountability, and development of
shared values, management of human resources besides, the
strength and unique characteristics of its senior management. In
addition, the R&D within Nokia was a crucial factor that
explains the development of new products and businesses [14].

However, Nokia’s success did not last longer than 2007, as the
company went through a journey of a persistent declination of
its financial performance as illustrated in figure 1 below [4].

Figure 1 - Key data of Nokia mobile phones business unit – Source [4]

According to [16], Nokia’s collapse from the top of the
smartphone pyramid is due to three factors; (1) less technical
capabilities compared with the rivals’ (e.g. Apple), (2) high
level of complacency, and (3) failure of the leadership to see
the upcoming disruption, particularly Apple’s iPhone. Another
perspective views the factors to failure were; (1) the inability of
the executives to grasp the market accurately, (2) deviation in
the business tactics, and (3) lack of teamwork [8]. However, to
identify and define the gaps in Nokia’s previous strategies that
led to its disappearance from the mobile phone industry,
multiple aspects will be discussed in the following sections.
IV. LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGIC CHANGES
For around eleven years (1977-1988), Kari Kairamo was
the CEO of Nokia. During his leadership, the company was
transforming from a conglomerate to an internationally large
multi-industry firm with an emphasis on telecommunication
devices [3], mainly network equipment and digital switches for
the telephone exchange [13]. This period has been considered
as the era of growth, represented by the remarkable joint
venture with Salora to develop the radio telephone company
Mobira Oy in 1979, followed by the acquisition of ten large
electronic and telecommunication companies [17]. As a result,
Nokia became the largest electronics company in Scandinavia,
particularly after the introduction of the Mobira Senator in
1982, which was the first true mobile phone in box form with a
network standard of 1G [13]. Later in 1984, Nokia introduced
the Mobira Talkman, a portable car phone, which was featured
to be recharged from the car’s cigarette lighter socket, followed
by the introduction of Nokia Mobira Cityman brick-form
mobile phones in 1987 [17]. Kairamo has always been cited as
the driving force behind Nokia’s rise. This process of shifting
and transforming the company to this type of industry was
considered very successful, yet it did not complete due to his
sudden death in 1988 [3]. However, Simo Vuoriletho
succeeded him and led the company as a CEO till 1992.
Vuoriletho changed Nokia’s strategy from an aggressive buyer
to a seller of the basic industrial units [18]. This was considered
not strategic since all Nokia’s businesses were divested [19].

This strategy left the company with internal and external
conflicts, particularly with the two main shareholders at that
time, the Union Bank and Kansallis Osake Pankki [3]. The
company then failed to turn around among the unrestrained
changes in the world between 1988 to 1991 [18].
In 1992, Jorma Ollila has appointed as the CEO and since
then, the era of modern Nokia has begun [3]. Ollila led the era
of the digital GSM expansion and refocused Nokia by the
strategic choice for mobile technology and wireless business
[7, 19]. Despite the process of restructuring at Nokia started at
the time when Vuoriletho was the CEO however, Ollila has
continued this phase [18], particularly during 1994-1995,
where the company witnessed a cultural change, namely the
value-based leadership and management [3, 17]. Trust, loyalty,
and commitment were the key values within Nokia under
Ollila’s leadership, while employees enjoyed a freedom and
took responsibility [3, 20]. Ollila in fact geared Nokia’s
strategy towards; “internal product development based on
concentration of intangible assets in know-how, skilled people
and filling of critical patents, while operations were based on
coherent and efficient process architecture, and strong customer
orientation offering that was integrated with technical
consumer-focused solutions” [3, p. 5]. Moreover, in 1994,
Nokia 2110 DCT/GSM handset was brought to the market with
(618,000) units sold [20], making the shift from a Finish
company to a global payer [3]. Figure 2 illustrates the number
of mobile phones produced and sold per year for Nokia and its
rivals during 1990-2012, which reflects the upward streaming
by Nokia starting in 1994. Ollila’s leadership led Nokia to be
the number one mobile phone manufacturer in the world by
1998 [17] and continued in the lead until he left in 2006 [4].

U.S. company in that respect” [21, p. 12]. With his vision and
background, Kallasvuo was considered the right CEO to deal
with the financial markets and production optimization, but he
was not a fit in managing the market changes and the
innovation disruption [22]. This gap has reflected on his vision
towards the smartphones disruption, which obviously caused
the downward spiral in the overall Nokia’s market share. In
fact, Nokia’s market share fell from 39% in 2009 to 28% by the
end of 2010 [2] (see figures 1&2). Apparently, this was the
reason that led to replacing Kallasvuo with Stephen Elop in
2010, who was the first CEO from outside Nokia and was
expected due to his capabilities as the former head of Microsoft
business division to be the best fit to turn around Nokia [3].
Elop reformed the team of the executive board management
and the company structure, splitting devices and services
business units into separate smart devices and mobile phones
units [4]. However, the famous “Burning Platform” memo and
the metaphor he used to compare the company with the burning
oil platform considered a controversial choice of the statement
[4]. Elop by that expressed his lack of trust in the company’s
core products, particularly the Symbian, and MeeGo platforms,
and therefore, he developed a strategic partnership with
Microsoft to adopt Windows Mobile OS instead [2, 3]. Elop’s
strategic intent was to gain a quick lead in the smartphone
market and retain Nokia’s leading position in the low-end
mobile phones. Obviously, Elop as well has failed to
understand the users’ wants and needs in term of the platform
that operates the products. Microsoft mobile OS was not the
right fit to compete with Apple’s iOS and Google Android. In
fact, this strategy led the stock price of Nokia to be dropped by
62%, the mobile phone market share dropped by 50%, the
smartphone market share dropped from 33% to 3%, and the
cumulative loss reached 4.9 billion euros [24]. The reflection of
Elop’s strategies can be clearly seen in the downward
performance as depicted in figure 3 below.

Figure 2 - Mobile phones produced per year – Source [3]

Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo who was Nokia’s CFO has succeeded
Ollila in 2006. He implemented another cultural change by
focusing on control due to the logistic crises and shifting the
ownership from traditional Finnish investors to international
investors, and to American mutual funds with short-term profit
expectations as well as aggressive and active policies [3]. This
strategic change was Kallasvuo’s vision since he was the CFO
as he once said; “there is no way on earth this country
[Finland] could own Nokia. Even if every penny of every
investor in Finland was put into Nokia stock, the Finnish could
hold perhaps 25 percent of the company. So, we had to go to
the biggest capital market in the world and really become a

Figure 3 - Elop’s strategy – Source [23]

V. LOGISTIC AND BUSINESS ARCHITECTURE
To control the logistics and cope with the increasing
demand on mobile phones, Nokia developed a strategy of
market segmentation based on the distinction among the
technologies, high-end and low-end markets, and entertainment
and mobile services [3]. This strategy, in fact, has augmented
the layers of the management (over 300 VPs and Senior VPs

globally) and built a complicated organizational structure that
has caused considerable delays in the decision-making
processes [25]. With this excessive organizational complexity
and bureaucracy, decisions regarding each product were taking
months if not years to be made. Therefore, the responsiveness
to the rapid-changing mobile market has been significantly
affected [26]. According to [27], the greatest barriers to growth
are often caused by a dynamic called the “Growth Paradox”,
which is the buildups of complexity and bureaucracy. This
paradox caused for the case of Nokia; “the loss of the internal
metabolism, speed, self-awareness, sense of urgency, and
general bloat of staff instead of any outside factors they may
have missed” [27, p. 2].

and software solutions [3]. Figure 5 shows the upward
streaming of Nokia’s number of patents filed during 19902013, making the highest number of patents in 2008.
Importantly, prior to 2008, Nokia has been collaborating much
more through joint R&D, outsourcing, and standardization
consortia, but has at the same time managed to develop and
maintain a strong brand name and corporate identity [31]. At
the end of 2006, 31% of the employees worked in R&D,
although largely in product development [24].

VI. R&D STRATEGY
The major focus of the R&D within Nokia was on product
development, while the only minor portion was on basic
research [3]. During the 1990s, the R&D efforts were mostly
focused on the basic development of both mobile phones and
mobile data communications, however, the focus on product
development was incremental rather than radical [21]. Nokia
conducted most of the R&D in-house (i.e. Nokia Research
Centre NRC), as well as in 44 international research centers
located in 12 countries [3, 21]. The NRC was closely
associated with schools in Finland as part of the open
innovation policy, represented by partnerships with the
Tampere University of Technology as the core partner besides,
Aalto and Oulu Universities [3]. In addition to partnerships
with top American schools such as MIT and Stanford as well as
Chinese schools such as BUPT and Tsinghua [3]. Nokia spent a
huge sum of its revenues and 10% of its sales on R&D [28, 29].
The majority of the NRC funding sourced from the business
divisions and researchers were asked to explain what they were
doing by getting buy-in from the technology users [21].
According to the Bernstein Research [30], Nokia spent around
$3.9 billion in 2010 on developing its mobile phones, which is
almost three times the average of its rivals spending, while
third of the total spending on R&D for the same year went to
the development of Symbian OS. Figure 4 below explains
Nokia’s spending on R&D from 1990-2012.

Figure 4 – Nokia’s R&D spending in euros – Adopted from [3]

Nokia’s spending on R&D has produced a remarkable list
of innovations that consist of a variety of products ranging
from network components to handset features, digital camera

Figure 5 - Number of Patents at Nokia (1990-2013) – Adopted from [3]

VII. INNOVATION STRATEGY
Nokia is a technology-intensive firm therefore, it has
massively invested to the R&D as discussed before. This huge
investment led to release dozens of mobile devices every year
to meet the dynamic and rapid changing in the consumers’
preferences and desires for additional and more features and
settings, which required rigorous input and innovation [4].
Many people think that Nokia’s failure is rooted in the lack of
innovation however, this company had a great portfolio of
innovations and patents, explained in figure 5. For example, in
2002, Nokia demonstrated a prototype of 3D user interface,
which means five years before its rivals brought it to the
market [25], while in 2004, it has demonstrated a smartphone
prototype with a large touch screen, or in other words, three
years before the Apple iPhone was launched. Furthermore, the
leadership at Nokia was mindful of having a well-defined
advanced technology and competitive advantages based on
high-tech products [3]. When the leadership team reflected on
Nokia’s innovation record in the 1990s, it was clear that
Nokia’s engineers had excelled at the technological innovations
needed to improve the existing product categories [21, p. 15].
The concept of the open innovation has been early and
effectively adopted [3, 31] as the company embedded its efforts
in both local and international innovation networks [31].
During 1997-2002, (i.e. the beginning of the third generation
(3G) of mobile telecommunications), or in other words, the
advent of the Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service
UMTS, Nokia was able to develop 48 agreements of strategic
alliance, as 25 of which were joint development agreements, 16
co-production contracts, 6 joint ventures and one
standardization consortium [31]. Furthermore, the company
adopted an ambidextrous approach to ensure both exploitation
predominant and existing technologies as a significant and
ideally a cost-effective basis with high volumes in one hand,
and exploration by establishing a venturing fund on the other

hand [3]. In addition, Nokia adopted an acquisition strategy
that led to acquiring more than 50 companies and/or businesses
during 1997-2013 [32]. These acquisitions included advanced
technologies (e.g. Sega.com, Intellisync Corporation), product
concepts (e.g. MetaCarta), access to content (e.g. music:
Loudeye Corporation; maps: Navteq). However, this strategy
was not very successful since many ideas, projects, and plans,
with few exceptions, did not materialize [3].
VIII. PRODUCT SEGMENTATION
One explanation how Nokia succeeded in becoming the
choice for the majority of the users is the clear identification of
the users’ segmentation and the development of distinctive
value propositions to meet each segment’s wants and needs,
which was a strategy that has been adopted since the era of
Nokia’s Talkman and Cityman [33]. This strategy was
developed to cope with the market expansion, portability,
design, style, and services as shown in figure 6, which
illustrates the segmentation based on three generations;
technology G1, lifestyle G2, and functionality G3 [34]. Nokia
launched a variety of mobile phones devices that have been
innovated to meet the strategy for market segmentation. In
2007 and 2008, a new segmentation structure was developed to
comprise 12 user categories strategized along two dimensions;
higher involvement-lower involvement, and rationalaspirational [35].

deterioration, which started in early 2008 and lasted until when
Nokia sold its mobile devices and services business in early
2014.
1) Early Stage – Nokia’s Dominance
Since an early stage, Nokia strongly acknowledged that the
development of smartphones and the software platforms were
the new path for mobile communications industry [4]. In 2003
Nokia released its first smartphone based on Symbian OS v7.0
kernel software, the Nokia 6600, although its screen was a TFT
“non-touch” [3]. Moreover, in 2004 the company introduced
Nokia 7710 (feature-packed multimedia smartphone with pen
input and handwriting recognition), as the first TFT resistive
touchscreen, Symbian OS powered smartphone, which might
be defined as the early prototype of today’s smartphones [40]
as shown in figure 7. However, according to various
technological defects, this smartphone was not made
commercially available in the market [4]. According to [42], in
2005, Nokia brought together some researchers from NRC and
academia to brainstorm the future of sensor networks. Within
this brainstorming, the researchers discussed how the phone
could serve as a user interface and an entry for existing sensor
networks [42]. In fact, the category of smartphones as part of
the Nokia’s strategy regarding mobile phone business unit was
officially announced in the 2005 annual report due to the
adaptation of various features and rapid evolvement of mobile
devices [43].

Table 1 in Appendix A lists all the feature phones series
and smartphones that Nokia has developed and released. This
outstanding list proves how various and innovative products
Nokia has delivered to the world [36]. Importantly, Nokia
released 406 different models during 1995-2013, making the
highest number in 2008 by releasing 47 different models,
followed by 44 in 2009, 28 in 2010, 36 in 2011, 30 in 2012,
and 25 in 2013. However, Nokia’s strategy represented by
launching so many products every year and the development of
this type of detailed segmentation have led to an
overabundance of product-market combinations, which has
been criticized as a lack of product focus, and a main reason
why Nokia couldn’t develop and release the one product that
would compete with its rivals’ [3].
IX. RECOGNITION OF SMARTPHONES
The question that often been asked is what makes a
smartphone is a smartphone? However, a smartphone is a
mobile phone that offers more advanced computing ability and
connectivity than a contemporary basic feature phone [37]. In
other words, a smartphone is a handheld device that integrates
mobile phone capabilities with the more common features of a
handheld computer or PDA [38]. A smartphone allows users to
store information, send and receive e-mails, install programs,
socialize and browse online, and along with using a mobile
phone in one device [39]. We will intensively discuss Nokia’s
recognition and demonstration of smartphones (both hardware
and software) based on two stages. The early stage, or the stage
of Nokia’s dominance, which started in the early 2003 and
lasted until early 2008, and the disruption stage, or the stage of

Figure 6 - Nokia mobile phones development – Adopted from [35]

Figure 6 - Nokia 7710 smartphone prototype in 2004 – Source [41]

The emergence of mobile phones new features, which
meant that the new generation of the mobile phones would be
capable of running computer’s applications such as email, web
browsing and enterprise software in addition to the capabilities
of having built-in features such as music players, video
recorders, mobile TV and other multimedia features [4]. In
2006, Nokia released 35 mobile phones [3] included the release
of the traditional products; the 4-digit series, as well as the
release of both N and E-series [44]. During the same year, the
market trends have marked the shift in Nokia’s strategy to
diversify the activities of the company to further the focus on
consumer internet services, network solutions and the increase
in professional and enterprise services [4]. In fact, 2006
considered as a milestone for Nokia’s development in Asia,
particularly in China, where the annual sales and exports in this
country reached more than 10 billion euros, marking China as
the largest market for Nokia globally [8].
The release of Nokia’s N-series (i.e. Nokia smartphones),
enabled the users to send and receive emails over multiple
networks, and enjoy the Universal Plug and Play, mobile TV,
music, photo sharing, and games, have all reflected the
convergence in the market strategies and product developments
[3]. In Spring 2007, Nokia released N95 (see figure 8) as an
early smartphone [46], which was equipped with an
accelerometer and GPS (i.e. Nokia maps) [3, 46]. The N95 was
a flagship smartphone that was developed to beat its rivals’ [4].
It was also a complete multimedia computer with a list of
functionalities that have never integrated before into a single,
pocket-sized device [47]. This version of Nokia’s smartphones
had a high-end rear and front-end camera for video calls, play
audio and video and included business applications [3].
However, its operating system “Symbian” and Java Micro
Edition (JME) virtual machine rather limiting since they both
have been developed to use a limited portion of the memory
and computational resources [46]. Two months later, Nokia
global market share has jumped from 33% to 36%, while the
smartphone market share reached around 70% [3]. A year later,
Nokia announced that more than 7 million units of this model
were sold worldwide [47].

Figure 7 - Nokia 95 - Source [45]

2) Disruption Stage – Nokia’s Deterioration
In June 2007, Apple launched its first iPhone 3G [3, 4], to
make obvious differences in the technical specifications
compared with Nokia N95’s [13]. The N95’s features such as
the small and non-touchscreen, complicated interface, slow
Symbian OS, non-user-friendly app customization compared to
those of the iPhone have proved that the iPhone outperformed
[36]. Although the iPhone was criticized for the lack of 3G
support and poor camera quality, however, its big touchscreen
and the iOS platform have caught the users’ imagination, and
therefore, it thoroughly shortened the time to compete and
surpass [47]. Obviously, Nokia failed to recognize that the
users were no longer interested in power, but instead in the ease
of use [48]. However, by Q4 of 2007, Nokia’s market share
regarding smartphones was still the largest compared to Apple
and other major players as shown in figure 9 below [49].

Figure 8 – Q4, 2007 Smartphones Market - Adopted from [49]

The threat of Apple’s iPhone and the release of the first
Google’s Android version 1.0 in 2008 forced Nokia to respond
strategically by introducing Nokia 5800 Xpress Music with
Symbian OS and first touchscreen [13, 25]. Although around 8
million units of this model were sold [50] yet, this smartphone
did not manage to compete with the quality of the iPhone, since
it was designed based on Series 60 5th Edition, which was later
criticized for its user interface as it was not optimized for a
touchscreen and was nowhere comparable to Apple’s iPhone
[25]. As a result of this new failure, Nokia’s profit by Q3 of
2008 dropped by 30% and sales by 3.1% [13]. On the contrary,
iPhone’s sales increased steeply and quickly by around 330 %

during the same period [50]. However, Nokia continued to
lunch new smartphones (e.g. N97 in 2009), which was
designed to take over the iPhone, but according to one of
Nokia’s top managers, this smartphone was a total fiasco [16].
Taking into the consideration that Nokia did not penetrate in
the North American market, even after the competition became
fierce with Apple [3]. Yet, Nokia’s battle continued, and hence,
an “iPhone Killer” and a flagship N8 powered by the improved
Symbian^3 [4] with AMOLED capacitive touchscreen [51]
was introduced in Spring 2010. Nonetheless, 2010 witnessed
the introduction of two remarkable smartphones; iPhone 4 and
Samsung Galaxy S1[25]. In fact, the introduction of these
smartphones caused Nokia’s smartphones market share to
decline from 38% in 2009 to 27.6% by the end of 2010 [2, 52,
53] as shown in figure 10, while the mobile devices market
share as well has dropped from 34% in 2009 to 32% in 2010
[4]. Nokia persistently struggled to release a smartphone that
either matches its rivals’ high-end smartphones (e.g. Apple,
Samsung, HTC) or competes with much cheaper manufacturers
such as ZTE or Huawei [52].
In June 2011, Nokia introduced a new smartphone, N9 with
an AMOLED capacitive touchscreen and powered by MeeGo
1.2 [54, 55]. Yet, the operating system of this smartphone was
a hybrid that is mainly built on Harmattan, the legacy Maemo 6
code base that Nokia closed when it committed to MeeGo 1.2.
This means that the distinction will be little more than an
implementation detail as far as users and application developers
are concerned [56]. In fact, N9 was developed to be the only
Nokia’s MeeGo smartphone [25, 57]. However, in October
2011, Nokia launched Lumia 800 and Lumia 710 to be
powered for the first time by Microsoft Windows Phone 7.5
Mango [25, 57]. Nevertheless, these Lumia smartphones did
not make any success, but instead, they have incurred Nokia
more losses regarding its smartphone market share, which
dropped to 12.2% by the end of 2011 [53]. Not surprisingly,
net sales dropped from 38.66 billion euros by the end of 2011
to 30.80 by the end of 2012 [58], while the market share fell
extremely to (2.9%) as shown in figure 10.

Figure 9 - Nokia’s market share, Q1,2007 - Q2, 2013 - Reproduced from [53]

Later in 2012, Nokia released Lumia 920 [59], which is
powered by Microsoft Windows Phone 8, and became one of

the best-selling smartphones in many countries as well as at
Amazon.com [25]. Nonetheless, there is a debate about the
competitiveness of this model. In one hand, some reviewers
viewed this model as a high-quality build, good camera
features, and a top-notch suite of integrated apps [13]. In fact,
Lumia 920 helped Nokia to become profitable during Q4 of
2012 (+ 202 million euros) after six consecutive quarters of
huge losses [60]. It also helped to make a very slight increase
of the smartphone market share in Q2 of 2013 (see figure 10)
[53]. On the other hand, users of this smartphone lost the
interest due to many factors such as the lack of third-party
applications support, the device weight and dimensions,
overheating issue, battery life when using GPS or Maps, blurry
captured images, slow picture taking, and difficulty to transfer
video to YouTube, in addition to a relatively high price for
such specifications [61]. In a short, Lumia 920 failed to
compete with the Apple’s iPhone and Samsung’s Galaxy [13].
Therefore, Nokia’s sales by the end of 2013 dropped to more
than half of its sales in 2012, making only 12.7 billion euros
[58], and the company started to make losses again during the
entire 2013 [60]. In the 2013 annual report, Nokia justified the
declination in smartphone’s net sales primarily to lower
volumes, which affected by the competitive industry dynamics
including the strong momentum of competing for smartphone
platforms, in addition to the transitioning portfolio from
Symbian products to Lumia products [62].
X. SMARTPHONE’S OPERATING SYSTEMS
The era of smartphones goes beyond just the product
innovation to significantly comprise the innovations of the
operating systems OS that operating them [63]. In other words,
to integrate both hardware and software in the making of one
successful product. Originally, Nokia’s phones were powered
by Nokia’s OS, which lasted until 1998 when the company
started the Symbian initiative; a platform launched by Psion, a
PDA-provider as an alternative to its branded OS [3]. Nokia
has extensively exploited two options; first, to continue the
development of its Symbian OS, and second, to develop a new
MeeGo capability before turning to Windows Phone OS in
2011 [4]. In this chapter, we will review the smartphones’
operating systems at Nokia; Symbian, MeeGo and Windows
Phones.
1) Symbian OS
As discussed before, Nokia approached the smartphones’
market since 2003 by introducing the Nokia 6600, but its N95
in 2007 was considered as the first real smartphone, powered
by Symbian OS and Java Micro Edition (JME), as both were
developed to use limited portion of the memory and
computational resources [46]. However, Nokia’s dominance of
the market till the end of 2007 was principally due to the
Symbian OS [3]. As listed in table 1 in Appendix A, most of
Nokia’s phones series (i.e. both featured phones and some
smartphone) were developed to be powered by Symbian OS.
Although the core strengths of the Symbian powered devices
characterized in its technological dominance, such as better
camera, Bluetooth, 3G connectivity, and GPS features (Nokia’s
map) however, they did not offer such exciting user interface as

Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android have had [4]. Furthermore,
although Apple’s iOS and the Linux based Android open
platform became major threats to Nokia’s Symbian since 2007
[3] yet, the Symbian was the most popular smartphone OS on a
worldwide level until the end of 2010 [64]. According to [65],
the Symbian OS made a market share of (32.3%) by Q4, 2010,
followed by Android (30.5%) and Apple iOS came third with a
global market share of (15.8%) as shown in figure 11 below.

Figure 10 – Smartphones’ OSs (Q4, 2010) - Reproduced from [65]

However, the Symbian OS failed in creating an ecosystem
and providing enough applications for its users, since its
developers did not understand that the basic functions were not
enough in the growing smartphone market, adding to that the
technical problems with the operating system, which was
slowed down the developers of the applications [2, 3, 4, 66].
The problem behind the failure of the Symbian OS urged to
be the fragmentation of the software architecture [4]. In
addition, the Symbian in the early stage was written to run on
very low power CPUs, which led to even less processing power
than for instance, the Linux OS or iOS in achieving similar
tasks [64]. The Symbian has not been developed to support
several devices or integrate different features at the same time,
which led to creating complicated issues for the whole Nokia’s
software development. According to [4], “the biggest
difference between Symbian and the most popular operating
systems today, such as Android or iOS, was that the device
development was driving the platform development-the
product-specific software was in many cases only compatible
with that certain device” [4, p. 33]. Furthermore, according to
[67, 68] the Symbian failed due other reasons such as; outdated
interface, lack of applications, perpetual hanging, and outdated
browser. However, in February 2011, the Symbian era and its
development have come to an end, particularly when Nokia
announced the partnership with Microsoft in making Windows
Phone as the smartphones’ primary platform [3, 4, 25]. Yet,
Nokia continued to ship devices based on Symbian [69] until
the last Symbian device has been shipped in Summer 2013 [4].
2) MeeGo OS
Under the name of Open Source Software Operations, the
MeeGo development team was formulated and started in 2005
to explore alternatives for the Symbian OS [4], which was
renamed in 2007 as the Maemo team [3]. The Linux-based,

open-source software platform, was announced in 2010 by
merging the Maemo team (renamed again in 2010 to be the
MeeGo team [3]) with Intel’s Moblin to jointly create the
MeeGo OS [3, 4]. According to 2011 annual report, the MeeGo
was expected to be a winning platform in the smartphone
market and a direct competitor to Apple’s iOS and Google’s
Android [57]. While Nokia N9 was launched successfully to
the market to be powered by the MeeGo OS for the first time as
a Nokia’s smartphone [57], which was considered as a peak of
MeeGo development [4] however, the eco-system around the
MeeGo platform never went beyond Nokia and Intel [3]. In
other words, the platform has not been supported, neither by
the hardware providers, nor the operators. The announcement
of Nokia’s new strategy in February 2011 and decision made to
choose Microsoft Windows Phone as the new operating system
for Nokia’s smartphones turned the MeeGo to be a project of
an open source mobile operating system, which in the long
term, would be used for market research on next-generation
devices, platforms, and user experiences [70]. Anyway, the
strategic partnership with Microsoft has ended Nokia’s
involvement in the MeeGo OS [3, 4, 25]. As mentioned before,
Nokia released only one MeeGo smartphone (i.e. N9) as an
outcome of two years of the platform development [70]. In fact,
Elop has made a clear decision that there is no returning to
MeeGo, even if N9 significantly succeeded [71]. Moreover,
two aspects should be taken into the consideration; first, Nokia
did not launch the N9 in the United States [72, 73], which
means that there was no chance for the MeeGo to be tested and
used in the North American market, and second, Nokia did not
release the market share that the MeeGo has made, and there is
no clear information even about how many units have been
sold worldwide. Moreover, the development of the MeeGo has
been in parallel with the development of the Symbian, which
considered a highly resource consuming, especially that these
two operating systems were not the only platforms that Nokia’s
R&D was investigating [4]. For that, some urged that the
“Burning Platform” metaphor of Elop was not incorrect [3].
3) Windows Phone OS
In February 2011, Nokia announced a partnership with
Microsoft to bring together the respective corresponding assets
and expertise of both parties to build a new global mobile
ecosystem for smartphones [57]. This partnership, under which
Nokia adopted and licensed Windows Phone from Microsoft as
the primary platform [69]. However, at the time when this
strategic partnership was announced, the market share of
Windows Phone OS was only 2.6%, whereas Symbian’s was
27.7%, and the Android’s was 36.4% as shown in figure 12.
These apparent variances in the platforms market shares have
created a debate around Nokia’s decision to abandon the
Symbian OS and to favor Windows phone OS on Android. In
one hand, many technologists urged that the steady pace
whereby Nokia develops new hardware would have made
perfect sense to have chosen Android [74], or it might have
leveraged the investment on the Symbian OS. Yet, Nokia’s
CEO at that time justified the decision to choose Windows
Phone OS since Nokia would have been a late entrant into the
Android space, while many strong rivals were already in there

[75]. Elop added that his leadership was concerned that a one
hardware manufacturer (implicitly meant Samsung) could have
dominated Android OS due to its resources and vertical
integration.

Figure 11 - Smartphones’ OSs (Q1, 2011) - Reproduced from [65]

On the other hand, others viewed the alliance with
Microsoft as a strategy to penetrate the US and North
American market since this market is a core for Windows [3]
and was important but untapped for Nokia. Yet, the Nokia
Lumia came about and the OVI store was integrated with the
Windows Phone Store and since then Nokia has collapsed [3].
Indeed, Nokia Lumia by all its models proved that the decision
to switch to Windows Phone OS was a misguided strategic
decision, which illustrated by the losses Nokia has incurred
since Q1, 2011 as shown in figure 13 below [58]. The failure in
nailing the smartphones’ market based on the strategic
partnership with Microsoft is in fact associated with the failure
of the Windows Phone OS itself. From figures 11 and 12
above, the market share of Windows phone OS has never
exceeded (3.6%) at best. In fact, this share continued to drop
quarter by quarter until it was (0%) market share by Q1, 2016.
According to [76], there were several reasons why Microsoft's
Mobile Business failed to take off, especially that Microsoft
was too late to the game, and the emerging market didn’t
respond the way Microsoft designed, planned and expected.

Figure 12 - Nokia's net profit/loss from 2009 to 2014 – Source [58]

XI. THE NEW NOKIA (2014-PRESENT)
By April 2014, Nokia has completely closed the business of
the mobile devices and services after it has been substantially
sold to Microsoft [77, 78]. This deal was originally announced
in September 2013, and it has included license patents to
Microsoft. Nokia considered the year 2014 as a new
transformation and a start of various essential changes,
particularly the appointment of Rajeev Suri as the President
and CEO, in addition to the allocation of five billion euros as a
capital structure optimization program [78]. The company has
newly emerged from the transaction with a firm financial
footing and three strong businesses; Nokia Networks, HERE
and Nokia Technologies [77, 78]. Each of these businesses is a
leader in its respective field, proved by the global presence of
the R&D facilities in Europe, North America, and Asia, while
the sales started to take over in 140 countries [78]. Nokia in
fact started to make profits in Q2, 2014 [60], although it has
decreased in the subsequent quarters yet, this change has been
considered a major positive transformation resulted from the
new leadership and converged strategies. According to [77], the
reflection of this transformation can also be seen in the
company financial performance (net sales, gross profit,
dividend per share, and net cash in million euros) during 2014,
2015 and 2016 [79]. Furthermore, as a part of the new
transformation and strategies, Nokia announced a strategy to
create new businesses and licensing opportunities in the
consumer eco-system [77]. Indeed, in May 2016, a strategic
brand and intellectual property licensing agreement were
signed to grant HMD Global Oy (HMD), a newly-established
Finnish private venture based in Helsinki, Finland an exclusive
global license to create Nokia branded mobile phones (both
feature phones and smartphones) and tablets for the next ten
years [11, 12]. The agreement entered into effect on December
1st, 2016, allowing HMD to begin the operations as the new
home of Nokia phones [77]. HMD and FIH Mobile Ltd., a
subsidiary of Taiwanese firm Foxconn Technology have
bought the feature phone assets from Microsoft for $350
million euros [9, 10]. The deal included brands, software and
services, customer contracts and supply agreements as well as
the transfer of 4,500 employees [80]. Nokia also announced
that the remainder of Microsoft feature phone business assets,
including manufacturing, sales, and distribution, would be
acquired by FIH Mobile Ltd, while Nokia Technologies and
HMD have signed an agreement with FIH to establish a
collaboration framework to support the building of a global
business for Nokia-branded mobile phones and tablets [12].
This agreement gave HMD Global full operational control
of sales, marketing, and distribution of Nokia-branded mobile
phones and tablets, with exclusive access to a prominent global
sales and distribution network to be acquired from Microsoft
by FIH, access to FIH world-leading device manufacturing,
supply chain and engineering capabilities, and to its growing
suite of proprietary mobile technologies and components [12].
However, in order for HMD to complete its portfolio of Nokia
branding rights, the company has conditionally agreed to
acquire the rights to use the trademark of Nokia on feature

phones until 2024 from Microsoft, and to design rights relating
to Microsoft feature phone business, where these agreements
will make HMD the sole global licensee for all types of Nokia
branded mobile phones and tablets [11]. Importantly to
mention that Nokia is not an investor in HMD Global, but it
has a representation on its board and will receive a royalty on
every Nokia branded device that HMD Global makes and sells
[77, 81, 82].
XII. NOKIA PHONES ARE BACK
On December 1st, 2016, HMD has officially announced its
entry to the market to bring Nokia-branded phones [83]. A
week later, HMD announced the introduction of its first mobile
phone; Nokia 150 and Nokia 150 Dual SIM phones, and they
would be officially available in the Market by January 2017
[84]. Later in February of the same year, the very famous
Nokia 3310 (new look) has been announced and then released
in May at a price of 49 euros [85]. However, no clear
information available about how many units have been sold
from both Nokia 150, and Nokia 3310 to date, and how was the
impact of these new versions on the market of the feature
phones. Furthermore, in January 2017, HMD launched its first
Android-based smartphone (Nokia 6) into China, explaining
that the Chinese market was selected preliminary to reflect the
company’s desire in meeting the real world needs of consumers
in different markets around the globe [86, 87]. HMD viewed
the Chinese market as the best option based on the increasing
number of the users with over 552 million in 2016 and
expected to grow to more than 593 million by 2017 [87]. This
was considered an important strategic decision since premium
design and quality are highly valued by Chinese consumers
[87]. However, during the Mobile World Congress, which held
in Barcelona in February 2017, HMD announced a new era for
Nokia smartphones by launching Nokia 6 globally [88].
Perhaps, it was the 100,000 units sold of this smartphone in one
minute in a flash sale in China for approximately $250 per unit
[89, 90] what really encouraged HMD to launch this model
globally. According to [91], “While we are not sure how many
units actually were available, it is not entirely surprising given
that the handset had received over a million registrations for its
first flash sale”. During the same event, HMD unveiled that a
new generation of Nokia smartphones would be released;
Nokia 5 and Nokia 3. This announcement remarked the new
standard in design, quality, and user experience throughout the
range. Nokia 5 would be retailed at an average global retail
price of 189 euros [92] while Nokia 3 for 139 euros [93]. In
Appendix B, Nokia 5 and Nokia 3 are shown in figures 15 and
16 and briefly described in tables 2 and 3 respectively. The new
range of Nokia smartphones all run Android™ Nougat
and offer a pure, secure and up to date experience and will all
feature Google Assistant. [88].
It is early to review and analyze the users’ desirability
based on the performance of these smartphones and to judge
whether they would compete strongly although they are
operated by Android and would be sold for highly competitive
prices. However, the smartphones industry is a very wellestablished and has a very advanced technology. The players in

this industry (e.g. Apple, Samsung, Huawei, HTC, etc.) are
already having powerful brands, which have been built
according to their high-quality and high reliability products for
long period of time. Therefore, creating and sustaining
competitive advantages will require not only financial
capabilities and R&D strategies, but also strong brand names,
and customer base, experience and loyalty. Nonetheless,
Nokia’s brand name is currently having no market share (see
figure 14), but it has a powerful brand name as well as a long
and outstanding history in the mobile phone industry regardless
of the failure in nailing the smartphone market caused by the
strategic gaps discussed in this research.

Figure 13 – Smartphones’ market shares, Q4, 2009 to Q2, 2017 - Source [94]

Furthermore, the smartphone market is a very price
sensitive with customers seek out the best value for money.
HMD strategy in setting low prices is reflecting a high
consideration of this critical factor. Generally, the smartphones
market is highly competitive as the number of options is
considered significant, which is creating a high power for the
smartphones’ users to compare, select and eventually make
decisions regarding which brand they select to meet their
wants, needs, desires, and budget. According to [95], the users
of products such as smartphones in fact, make their decisions
regarding the brand based on many factors that involve not
only how appealing is the product, but also on factors that drive
their emotions and engage them for long time as loyal
customers, particularly the drivers of the product and brand
experiences [95].
XIII. CONCLUSION
It is obvious that Nokia’s story of success has negatively
impacted its later strategies and performance since success
adversely developed a high level of complacency, that is
clearly seen in underestimating the rivals’ capabilities.
However, we have concluded that Nokia did not miss the
opportunity of the smartphones as it was fully aware of its
disruption. The huge investments in R&D, the variety of
inventions and innovations, and the market research and
performance are all proving that the company was very well
prepared for this disruption. Indeed, the problem at Nokia was
not the lack of innovation, but rather, it was the lack of
forecasting the right time to market. In addition, Nokia during
the time when smartphones became a necessity in people’s
lives, has misunderstood that the market needs were not just
about a mobile phone that makes calls, texts and connects to

the web, but also about the platform that operates all these
functions together while the users are delighted to achieve
more functionalities.
One can urge that the platforms that Nokia developed and
employed to power its smartphones since 2007 have achieved
all these tasks together, but Nokia still failed. That is a true
argument, however, all these platforms lacked the integration
into the eco-system that Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android
have had. In other words, it was not about the product
(hardware) and platforms (software) alone, but it was about the
eco-system that supported both. In fact, some viewed the battle
between platforms became a battle between eco-systems.
Importantly, although Nokia strategies to innovate, develop,
and release so many models each year was considered a
success as Nokia was keen to meet the needs and wants of
different segments of its customers however, this was
considered as a lack of the focus on the one product that can
attract most of the customers and compete perfectly with the
rivals’ products.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1 - NOKIA PRODUCT SERIES BASED ON GSMERENA.COM AND WIKIPEDIA.COM (1996-2017) – ADOPTED FROM [36]
Nokia Series

Year(s)

Descriptions

Nokia 1xxx

1996–2010

Most affordable phones. Mostly targeted towards developing countries and users needing only calls and
SMS, alarm clock, and reminders.

Nokia 2xxx

1994–2010

Entry-level phones. More advanced features than the 1000 series, newer models with color screens and
some feature cameras, Bluetooth and even A-GPS.

Nokia 3xxx

1997–2009, 2017

Nokia 5xxx

1998–2010

Similar in features to the 3000 series. Often more features towards active individuals, extra features for
music playback.

Nokia 6xxx

1997–2010

Mid-range to high-end phones. High number of features, conservative, unisex designs, business use.

Nokia 7xxx

1999–2010

Targeted towards fashion-conscious users, especially women; consumer-oriented; fancy design, test
features.

Nokia 8xxx

1996–2007

Ergonomics and attractiveness; exclusive, high-end materials.

Nokia 9xxx

1996–2007

Communicators prior E90 (the latest Communicator)

C-series

2010–2011

Affordable series optimized for social networking and sharing; OS Series 40 and C-5xx Symbian 60 5th
ed., C-6/7 Symbian^3.

E-series

2006–2011

Enterprise-class, business-use; Symbian S60 and E7 Symbian^3.

N-series

2005–2011

Highly advanced smartphones, with strong multimedia and connectivity features; mainly S60 3rd, but
Maemo in N900, MeeGo in N950, N8 Symbia^3.

X-series

2009–2011

Targeted to a young audience with a focus on music and entertainment; OS mainly Series 40, but X5
(updated) and X6 with S60 and X7-00 with Symbian^3.

3-digit series

2011–2012

Since the Nokia 500, Nokia has changed the naming rule for Symbian^3 phones.

Asha - Series

2011–2014

Affordable, optimized for social networking and sharing, meant for first time users.

Lumia- Series

2011–2014

Smartphones running Windows Phone. It also includes the Nokia Lumia 2520, a Windows RTpowered tablet computer. The series was sold to Microsoft in 2014 who branded these products under the
name Microsoft.

X Family

2014

A range of Android smartphones from Nokia. These were the first ever Nokia phones to run on Google's
Android OS.

3-Digit - Series
feature phones

2011–2016

Those phones are entry-level, classic mobile phones platform (with long work on battery). The series was
sold in 2014 to Microsoft which continued branding these products under Nokia. Microsoft sold this series
to HMD Global in 2016 which also continues branding these products under Nokia.

Mostly mid-range phones. Later targeted towards the youth market.

APPENDIX B

TABLE 2 - NOKIA 5 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - SOURCE [92]
Nokia 5 - Technical Description
Launch

Announced: February 2017
Status: Released June, 2017

Body

Dimensions: 149.7 x 72.5 x 8 mm
SIM: Single SIM (Nano-SIM) or Dual
SIM

Display

Type: IPS LCD capacitive touchscreen,
16M colors
Size: 5.2 inches

Platform

OS Android 7.1.1 (Nougat)

Memory

Card slot: microSD, up to 256 GB
Internal: 16 GB, 2 GB RAM

Camera

13 MP, f/2.0

Features

Fingerprint,
accelerometer,
proximity, compass

Battery

Non-removable Li-Ion 3000 mAh battery

Colors

Tempered Blue, Silver, Matte Black,
Copper

gyro,

Figure 14 - Nokia 5 - Source [92]

TABLE 3 - NOKIA 3 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - SOURCE [93]
Nokia 3 - Technical Description
Launch

Announced: February 2017
Status: Released June, 2017

Body

Dimensions: 143.4 x 71.4 x 8.5 mm
SIM: Single SIM or Dual SIM

Display

Type: IPS LCD capacitive touchscreen,
16M colors
Size: 5.0 inches

Platform

OS Android 7.1.1 (Nougat)

Memory

Card slot: microSD, up to 256 GB
Internal: 16 GB, 2 GB RAM

Camera

8 MP, f/2.0

Features

Accelerometer, gyro, proximity, compass

Battery

Non-removable Li-Ion 2650 mAh battery

Colors

Silver White, Matte Black, Blue, Copper
Figure 15 - Nokia 3 - Source [93]

